The Distinguishing Feature of Beliefs

Surajit Barua
Department of Philosophy, Seth Anandram Jaipuria College, Kolkata-700010.
surajitphilosophy@gmail.com



Submitted on: 14.11.2025
Accepted on: 28.06.2026



Abstract: This article explores the question: what individuates the propositional attitude of belief and distinguishes it from other truth-oriented propositional attitudes. It is argued here that a conviction in the proposition, beyond a certain threshold, with an intended global application, is all that individuates belief. To argue for this position, the relationship of belief with credence is explored. The distinction between belief and acceptance is also clarified. The clarification is put to use in explaining how can one have mutually conflicting beliefs at the same time.

References:

[1] Barua, S. (2025). Function Theory of Belief Formation and its Implications. [Doctoral Dissertation, Visva Bharati University]. Shodhganga. http://hdl.handle.net/10603/676875
[2] Bratman, M. E. (1992). Practical reasoning and acceptance in a context. Mind, 101(401), 1–15. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/101.401.1
[3] Buchak, L. (2014). Belief, Credence, and Norms. Philosophical Studies 169, 285–311. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0182-y
[4] Cohen, J. L. (1992). An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
[5] Frankish, K. (2009). Partial belief and flat-out belief. In Degrees of Belief (pp. 75–93). Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_4
[6] Friedman, J. (2019). Inquiry and belief. Noûs, 53(2), 296–315. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12222
[7] Ganson, D. (2008). Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief. Philosophical Studies 139(3), 441–458. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9133-9
[8] Harman, G. (1986). Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
[9] Hieronymi, P. (2005). The Wrong Kind of Reason. The Journal of Philosophy, 102(9), 437–457. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2005102933
[10] Hieronymi, P. (2009). Believing at will. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 39(sup1), 149–187. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2009.10717647

Key Words: Belief, Acceptance, Credence, attitude, proposition

Download Pdf

How to Cite

APA 7th Edition

Barua, S. (2026). The Distinguishing Feature of Beliefs. Antarvidya, 2(1), 36–45. https://doi.org/10.66182/antarvidya.v2.i1.005.2026

MLA 9th Edition

Barua, Surajit. “The Distinguishing Feature of Beliefs.” Antarvidya, vol. 2, no. 1, June 2026, pp. 36–45. https://doi.org/10.66182/antarvidya.v2.i1.005.2026