Quine on denying analytic-synthetic distinction
Dr. Hasen Ali Ahmed
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Indira Gandhi College, Boitamari, Bongaigaon (Assam)
hasenahmed786@gmail.com
Submitted on: 05.12.2025
Accepted on: 25.12.2025
Abstract: This paper attempts to explain and examine Quine’s critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction, a cornerstone of logical positivism, as presented in his seminal work “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. It reveals that Quine’s rejection of this distinction, rooted in his objections to synonymy and collateral information, challenges the traditional epistemological divide between a priori and a posteriori experience. By rejecting the notion of analytic truth, Quine advocates for a dogma-free philosophy, eschewing rigid rules and principles in favour of a more flexible and contextual approach to meaning and knowledge. Therefore, Quine’s critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction seeks to liberate philosophy from dogmatic assumptions, fostering a more nuanced and experience-driven inquiry into the nature of reality and human understanding.
Key Words: Analytic, judgment, synthetic